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This paper analyzes the cyclical properties of worker flows in Brazil and Mexico, two 
important developing countries with large unregulated or “informal” sectors. It generates three 
stylized facts that are critical to the accurate modeling of the sector and which suggest the 
need to rethink the approaches to date. First, the unemployment rate is countercyclical 
essentially because job separations of informal workers increase dramatically in recessions. 
Second, the share of formal employment is countercyclical because of the difficulty of finding 
formal jobs from inactivity, unemployment and other informal jobs during recessions rather 
than because of increased separation from formal jobs. Third, flows from formality into 
informality are not countercyclical, but, if anything, pro-cyclical. Together, these challenge the 
conventional wisdom that has guided the modeling the sector that informal workers are 
primarily those rationed out of the formal labor market. They also offer a new synthesis of the 
mechanics of the cyclical adjustment process. Finally, the paper offers estimates of the 
moments of worker flows series that are needed for calibration. 
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I. Introduction. 
 
  The flow approach to labor markets has become the basic toolbox to modern 
labor macroeconomics replacing the usual paradigm of supply and demand in a 
frictionless environment.
1 This approach has as its central insight that changes in the 
flows of workers in and out of unemployment tell far richer stories about the 
functioning of labor markets than changes in the stocks. Particularly notable is the 
ongoing and energetic debate in both the US and Europe over the relative importance of 




  To date, however, there has been little investigation of employment dynamics in 
developing countries where we find most of the world’s work force, and where 
macroeconomic fluctuations are often of dramatic magnitudes.
3 A priori, we might 
expect important differences from the OECD cases due the virtually universal presence 
of a large informal or unregulated micro firm sector that averages around 50% in Latin 
America.
4  Traditional views of the sector, with roots in Harris and Todaro’s rural 
migration early work, see informality as disguised unemployment, passively receiving 
workers who are unable to find a formal sector job.
5 The view of informal workers as 
the inferior or excluded segment of a dual labor market became highly influential in the 
International Labor Organization, its Latin America affiliate, the Latin America 
Regional Employment Program (PREALC), and the World Bank.  However, dating at 
least from Hart’s (1972) work in Africa, a parallel stream has stressed the largely 
voluntary nature of much of the entry into the sector, analogous to the mainstream 
literature such as Jovanovic (1982), and Evans and Jovanovic (1989), and Evans and 
Leighton (1989). 
 
                                                 
1 See Blanchard (1992), Pissarides (2000) and Rogerson et al. (2006). 
2 Shimer (2007), Elsby (2006), Fijuta and Ramey. (2006 and 2007), Mortensen and Nagypal (2005),  
Pissarides (2007) and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) 
3 This paper supercedes Bosch and Maloney (2006) which dealt with some elements of the present paper 
but restricted to Mexico. For discussion of the aggregate movements in informality across the cycle, see 
Fiess, Fugazza and Maloney (2006), Loayza and Rigolini (2007).    
4 See Perry et al. (2007) ch. 2 for a discussion of several measures. 
5 See Fields (2006) for a guide to multi-sectoral models with informal jobs.   3
  As the flow approach to modeling labor markets has become the standard in the 
literature, a new generation of search models has incorporated an informal sector (See 
Zenou, 2007, Albrecht et al. , 2006, Bosch, 2004, Kolm and Larsen, 2002 and 2004, 
Boeri and Garibaldi, 2001 and 2006,  and Fugazza, 2004.  However, while early US 
focused search models were firmly rooted in micro evidence from job and worker 
flows,
6 this new generation of models has had to work with few stylized facts about 
how the LDC markets adjust along the margins of unemployment and informality. 
 
This paper provides such stylized facts based on measures of gross flows of 
workers derived from the micro data on employment surveys in Mexico and Brazil over 
several business cycles.  To capture and formalize the dynamics, we follow Geweke 
(1986) in estimating labor market transitions in a continuous time context to correct for 
time aggregation
7 and employ recent techniques to decompose the contributions of the 
inflows and outflows rates to movements in unemployment and relative sectoral 
employment shares. These decompositions generate several conclusions with 
implications for the modeling of labor markets in developing countries.  
 
  First, as in the US, the unemployment rate is strongly countercyclical. The 
contemporaneous cyclical correlation with output is around -0.8 and its elasticity -4.3 
for Mexico and -4.5 for Brazil. However, in contrast to the US, where estimates of the 
contribution of the job separation rate to unemployment movements are generally a 
fraction of that of the job finding rate, separations are strongly countercyclical and very 
volatile, especially in periods of deep recessions such as the 1995 tequila crises in 
Mexico and the 1981-1983, 1990-1992 and 1998-1999 in Brazil. Job separations can 
explain around 40% of all cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, almost twice as much 
as the explanatory power of fluctuations in the job finding rate. However, strikingly, the 
relevant separations are largely those from the informal sector.  The formal sector shows 
muted cyclical separation dynamics more similar to those documented for the US.   
 
  Second, the sectoral composition of employment is also strongly cyclical.   
Informal (formal) employment as a share of working age population is generally 
                                                 
6 See for instance Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). 
7 That is, we control for the fact that the data is collected a fixed time intervals while transitions occur in 
continuous time.    4
counter-cyclical (pro-cyclical). On average, a 1% fall in output (from its trend) increases 
the share of informal employment by 0.20% and decreases the share of formal labor by 
0.5%. In all, formal employment as a share of total employment falls between 0.2% and 
0.3% for each percentage fall in output (from its trend). This occurs despite increased 
separation rates among informal workers during downturns, and relatively a-cyclical 
flows in the reverse direction. This paradoxical finding is explained by the large 
countercyclical fluctuations in the probability of finding a formal job from all other 
employment states, a finding consistent with the US literature explaining 
unemployment. Hence, the expansion (contraction) of the informal (formal) sector is not 
due to increased shedding of labor from the formal sector during downturns, but to the 
lack of access to formal employment in recessions. 
 
Third, analogous to the US literature (See Nagypal 2004 and Shimer 2005), 
flows among jobs, or in our case, employment states, are largely procyclical.  Of central 
importance, this includes transitions among the formal and informal sectors.  These 
patterns are therefore not consistent with the view of the informal sector as 
predominantly the disadvantaged end of a segmented labor market, or disguised 
unemployment (see Fields, 2006) which would suggest asymmetric flows- procyclical 
flows from informality to formality, and countercyclical flows in the reverse direction. 
Instead, the probability of formal workers transiting to an informal job is generally, 
procyclical, and the correlation of the bilateral cyclical flows between informal self-
employment and formality is a relatively high, 0.7 for both countries. Contrary to the 
view of the informal sector as the safety net for separated workers during downturns, 
formal to informal outflows actually decrease during downturns thereby mitigating the 
rise in informality.       
 
  Putting the above findings together gives a view of labor market adjustment in 
LDCs across the business cycle that has elements of the traditional view of informality 
across downturns, but perhaps with an updated mechanism and without a connotation of 
overall inferiority of the informal sector. While the symmetrical and procyclical 
transitions among all sectors suggest that informality is considered a desirable option by 
a large share of workers, the fact that formal sector hiring falls during downturns while 
the informal sector does not gives rise to the countercyclical behavior of the informal 
employment share.  However, the simultaneous increase in informal separation rates   5
into unemployment suggests that the idea of the sector as the flex-wage sector that can 
absorb excess labor is probably importantly incomplete.  
  
  Clearly, caution is advised in generalizing to the developing world from two 
middle-income Latin countries.  However, the similarity of these often counterintuitive 
results across two data sets and national contexts suggests that neither they nor their 
implications can be easily dismissed.   The right modeling of both inflows and outflows 
of employment is critical to understanding how developing country labor markets adjust 
and for making quantitative predictions about the unemployment rate and the relative 
employment shares over the cycle.   
 
  In addition, the insights into the nature of the informal sector- something that has 
been subject of thirty years of discussion
8- has important policy implications. While the 
sector is comprised of heterogeneous actors corresponding to both disguised 
unemployed and voluntarily entering “entrepreneurs”
9, its exaggerated size in 
developing countries raises the stakes surrounding the relative proportions dramatically. 
If the often 50% percent of developing country workers found in the informal sector 
show dynamics similar to those of the unemployed, then the labor market distortions in 
the formal sector are indeed large and the case for massive reform, compelling. As we 
suggest that this is not the case, then the policy focus shifts to understanding the cost-
benefit analysis that agents undertake in choosing among sectors.  Finally, although 
beyond the scope of this paper, the differing dynamics of the regulated and unregulated 
sectors –due to wage or other rigidities, particular characteristics of the micro firm 
sector, or characteristics of people who choose to enter the sector- may cast light on the 
factors driving cyclical dynamics more generally.   
    
  The next section discusses the data and methodology for estimating the 
continuous time transition rates underlying the analysis.  Section III presents evidence 
on the cyclical properties of the stocks of workers. Section IV analyzes the gross flows 
of workers by sector and speculates on what may explain the differing patterns 
                                                 
8 For a review of the literature and early work on transition matrices in developing country see Maloney 
(1999, 2005).  
9 For a survey on the methods estimating the size of the informal sector see Schneider and Enste (2000), 
Perry et. al (2007)   6
observed. Section V studies the contribution of these flows to the changes in labor force 
shares identified in section IV and discusses the implications of the theoretical analysis 





The data for Mexico are drawn from the National Urban Employment Survey 
(Encuesta Nacional the Empleo Urbano, ENEU) that conducts extensive quarterly 
household interviews in the 16 major metropolitan areas. The questionnaire is extensive 
in its coverage of participation in the labor market, wages, hours worked, etc. that are 
traditionally found in such employment surveys.  It is structured so as to track a fifth of 
each sample across a five quarter period. We have concatenated panels from the first 
quarter of 1987 to the fourth quarter of 2004. Each individual contributed with four 
transition pairs.  In constructing each quarterly pair, we lose roughly 10% of the sample 
to attrition. Antman and Mckenzie (2005) conclude after careful analysis of the same 
data that the bias resulting from this attrition is likely to be very small.  
 
  The ENEU has suffered only minor modifications during the covered period but 
it has substantially changed its geographical coverage. From 1987 to 1992 the survey 
comprised 16 major urban areas. In 1992, 18 more urban areas were introduced and 
throughout the following years additional cities were included in the sample to reach 44 
at the beginning of 1998. We choose to constraint our sample to the original 16 cities 




  The data for Brazil are draw from Monthly Employment Survey (Pesquisa 
Mensal de Emprego, PME) that conducts monthly household interviews in 6 of the 
major metropolitan regions (covering 25% of the national labor market). The 
questionnaire is very similar to the ENEU, although some important differences are 
discussed below. The PME is structured so as to track each household during four 
consecutive months and then drop them from the sample for 8 months, after which they 
are reintroduced for another 4 months. The rotation procedure is such that each month 
one fourth of the sample is substituted by households to form a new panel. Thus, after 4   7
months the whole initial sample has been rotated and after 8 months a third different 
sample is being surveyed. After 12 months the initial sample is reencountered. Over a 
period of two years, three different panels of households are surveyed, and the process 
starts again with three new panels. We have concatenated panels from the January 1983 
to December 2001. Regrettably, the PME was drastically modified in 2002 and it is not 
possible to reconcile the new and old definitions unemployment.  The monthly attrition 
rate in the PME is between 5% and 10% of the sample. 
  
Both datasets were purged of mismatches along the sex and age dimensions.   
There are, however, still some issues of comparability, especially in the definition of an 
informal worker. In the end, these do not appear to have significant impact on the 
results and the resulting cyclical patterns are quite similar between the two countries.   
  
 Defining Informality 
  Though, generally speaking, there is broad consensus in the literature on what 
constitutes an informal worker, studying transitions raises some particular definitional 
complexities that we discuss here. 
 
We follow the International Labour Organization (ILO) in dividing employed 
workers into three sectors: informal salaried (I), informal self employed (S) and formal 
sector workers (F).
10 Broadly speaking, formal workers are those working in firms 
licensed with the government and conforming to tax and labor laws, including minimum 
wage directives, pension and health insurance benefits for employees, workplace 
standards of safety etc. Informal workers, on the contrary, are those owners of firms that 
are largely de linked from state institutions and obligations and their employees who are 
not covered by formal labor protections.  
 
                                                 
10 The ILO defines informality as consisting of all own-account workers (but excluding administrative 
workers, professionals and technicians), unpaid family workers, and employers and employees working in 
establishments with less than 5.  We have also computed all the calculations presented in this paper 
considering the informal salaried those workers in small firms who have no social security with extremely 
similar results.   8
    Getting more specific, adopting what has been called a “labor protections” 
optic, 
11 the first group, the informal salaried, can be defined as those wage employees 
whose employers do not comply with the legal requirements. This, however, does not 
tell us whether these workers are working for small informal firms, or for large 
generally formal firms.
 In the absence of data on compliance with labor regulations the 
ILO traditionally recommended classifying informal as workers in small establishments 
of fewer than 5-10 employees, which tend to be informal along different dimensions. 
Though there is substantial overlap in these definitions (see Henley et al., 2006 and 
Perry et al., 2007), conceptually the distinction can be important for our analysis.  For 
instance, a transition from informal to informal under the “labor protections” definition 
might reflect purely a worker being granted benefits after a period of time but without a 
corresponding change in position and accompanying job search.  Similarly, under the 
size definition, a measured transition may simply be capturing the growth of the firm, 
but no change in actual job.  Relatedly, an emerging literature discusses firm decisions 
about whether or not to comply with legislation, and how a growing firm may choose to 
register and formalize its workers.  Formalization along this margin has been studied by 
De Soto (1989), Rauch (1991), De Paula and Sheinkman (2007) among others.   Again, 
a job “transition” defined as a change in protection status may simply reflect a firm 
becoming formal.       
 
 We classify on the basis of lack of compliance with labor legislation for issues 
of data comparability.  While the Mexican survey reports the establishment size in 
which the respondent works, the Brazilian does not.   Furthermore, compliance is 
relatively straightforward to capture in these surveys. In Mexico employers have to 
satisfy the contributions to the social security agency IMSS (or the equivalent for civil 
servants IMSTS) for their employees. Similarly, employers in Brazil are obliged to 
register their employees by issuing them a working permit or carteira the signing of 
which guarantees them access to formal labor protections. Therefore those wage 
employees not registered with the social security agency (in Mexico) or sem (without) 
carteira in Brazil are consider informal salaried.   
 
                                                 
11 See Perry et al. (2007)   9
In the end, the selection criterion does not appear critical.  We replicate the 
Mexico results defining very discrete categories based on both worker protections and 
firm size to ensure that, in fact, we are studying job transitions and the basic patterns 
remain. The reason is that a relatively small share (around 5-7%) of the workforce in 
firms of over 10 (presumably formal) reports being without coverage, and the 
contributions of changes in protection status within firm size categories to overall 
measured transitions is low.  Likewise, we find there are relatively few workers who 
change protection status and graduate to an adjacent firm size category, capturing, 
potentially, a position being formalized as a firm formalizes.   The bulk of our informal 
to formal transition are in fact, also transitions from micro firms of under 5 employees 
to substantially larger firms (non-adjacent firm categories). Given the short time span or 
our panels, the likelihood of large jumps in firm size seem unlikely.  Hence, most of the 
transitions we are studying are, in fact, transitions among jobs.  
 
The second group associated to informality is the large proportion (between 20% 
and 30% of the labor force) of independent or self-employed workers (S). This micro 
entrepreneurial group operating outside the regulatory system has been the focus of 
much of the literature dating from early work by Hart (1972). More recently, several 
authors have focused  on the decisions of these individuals to work within or outside the 
regulatory system (most recently, see De Paula and Scheinkman (2007), Loayza Rigolini 
(2006), Fajnzylber et. al.(2007). Both Mexican and Brazilian labor surveys include two 
categories to capture this micro entrepreneurial sector, self-employment and owners of 
firms. Ideally, we would consider all those self employed (excluding professionals and 
technicians without social security contributions)
12 and the owners of small micro firms. 
However again, in Brazil, we lack a measure of firm size in the data. We are left here 
with the choice of dropping all owners of firms or including them as informal self-
employment. We again cross checked with the Mexican sample to get some insight of 
what proportion of self reported owners correspond to large formal firms. It turns out 
that only 1.5% of the universe of owners run firms with more than 15 employees. 
Therefore, for Brazil we choose to include all owners as informal self employed aware 
                                                 
12 There is also a relatively small group of self-employed in Mexico (less than 2% of all self-employed) 
that although under no legal obligation they satisfy the IMSS quotas. We consider them formal sector 
workers. In Brazil, however, self-employed do have the legal obligation to pay for social security 
contributions. This survey however does not provide this information. However, Henley et al. (2006)  
report that around 95% do not do so.    10
that there may be a very small proportion of owners of large firms that fall into this 
category. In all, including or excluding owners as part of the informal self-employed 
sector does not change the aggregate dynamics of this group in either country, since the 
bulk (around 85%) correspond to individual independent workers, with the other 15% 
corresponding to owners of firms.  
 
The remainder of the sample is divided into two non-employment groups 
identical to those in the advanced country literature: those out of the labor force (O), and 
the unemployed (U). These are defined as in the mainstream literature. 
 
III. Methodology 
Recent analysis on worker flows has put special emphasis on correcting for time 
aggregation (Shimer, 2007 Elsby et al., 2007 Fujita and Ramey (2006 and 2007) and 
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2007). Since the data on worker flows is tabulated at discrete 
quarterly or monthly intervals, average transition probabilities may provide misleading 
picture of worker mobility since transitions that are reversed within two surveys are 
missing. When there are only two states of employment, the transition rates can be 
obtained analytically from the monthly worker flows as in Shimer (2007). However, 
with more than two states no analytical solution is available and the transition rates have 
to be simulated. We instead follow an earlier Bayesian procedure (see Geweke 1986) 
that allows simultaneously estimating the whole transition rate matrix for a set of 
employment statuses.
13 We briefly discuss the procedure here.  
 
We assume that the observed discrete-time mobility process is generated by a 
continuous-time homogeneous Markov process Xt defined over a discrete state-space E 
= {1,….K} where K is the number of possible states (job sectors) a worker could be 
found in.
14 With observations on worker states at regular periodicity we construct a 
discrete time transition matrix P(t,t+n) where 
 
i t X j n t X n t t pij = = + = + ) ( | ) ( Pr( ) , (  for  ,..., 2 , 1 , 0 = t and  ,... 2 , 1 , 0 = n  
 
                                                 
13 This method has also been employed in Fougère and Kamionka (2003), 
14 For early work in this tradition, see Flinn and Heckman 1982 a, b and 1983).    11
The interpretation of  ij p is simply, the probability of moving from state i to state j in one 
step (t), that is average transition probabilities. Discrete time matrices are easily straight 
forward to compute as the maximum likelihood estimator for  ij p  is  i ij ij n n p / = , being 
ij n the total number of transitions from state i to state j  and  i n the total number of 
observations initially in state i. As t  0 → n , this gives rise to a  k x k transition intensity 









whose solution is given by: 
tQ e t P = ) (  (2) 
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The  ij q  elements can be interpreted as the instantaneous transition rates (hazard rates) 
from state i to state j. 
 
In practice, the estimation of continuous time transition matrices is subject to a 
major difficulty. It is possible that none of the solutions obtained for Q is compatible 
with the theoretical model expressed in equation (1) where the elements of Q have to 
satisfy the set of restrictions captured in equation (3). This is known as the 
embeddability problem. We follow Geweke et al. (1986), who propose a Bayesian 
procedure for statistical inference on intensity matrices as well as any function of the 
estimated parameters by using a uniform diffuse prior. The method consists of drawing 
a large number of discrete time matrices from a previously defined “importance 
function,” assessing their embeddability and constructing confidence intervals of the 
parameters or functions of interests using only the posterior distribution of those 
matrices that turn out to be embeddable.  This also provides a very natural way of 
assessing the probability of embeddability as the proportion of the embeddable draws.    12
We compute the continuous time matrices for every quarter (month in Brazil). All 
continuous matrices obtained in the paper show high probabilities of embeddability, 
ranging between 0.98 and 1. Therefore, compatibility of discrete and continuous time 
estimates does not seem to be an issue in theses particular datasets.  
 
Having obtained the transition rates from the discrete matrices, we then quarterly 
average the data for Brazil and smooth both Mexican and Brazilian series using a 4 
quarter backward moving average as in Fujita and Ramey (2006) to remove high 
frequency fluctuations in the data.  We study the cyclical components of the data by 
logging and de-trending the series using a HP filter with lambda 1600.  
 
 
III. Cyclical Patterns of Employment Shares  
 
  To set the overall context, we first focus at the evolution of each sector's share of 
the labor force across 1987-2004 in Mexico and 1983-2001 in Brazil. As a first 
approximation to the data, Figure 1 shows the unemployment rate and the share of 
formal employment for both countries.  The upper panels show the levels of the series 
while the lower panels show the HP de-trended cyclical components. The regions 
corresponding to a recessionary period are shaded to facilitate the visual analysis.
15 
 
  Initial inspection suggests two features of the series common to most developing 
countries. First, for both countries, the behavior of the unemployment rate denotes that 
the period of analysis includes a number of significant recessions and rapid periods of 
growth. Output fluctuations for Mexico (not shown), ranged from 8% below trend in the 
depths of the 1995 recession to 5% above trend in the posterior recovery. Output in 
Brazil was slightly less variable oscillating between 4% above and below trend.
16   
Second, recessions are generally characterized by increasing unemployment rates and 
shifts in the composition of employment towards informal activities.
17  
                                                 
15 Neither Mexico or Brazil has an institution such as the NBER determining the starting and ending point 
of a recession, we have shaded those quarters where output is below trend.  
16 Quarterly output data used in the paper is provided by the national statistical institutes, INEGI for 
Mexico and IBGE for Brazil.  
17 Loayza and Rigolini (2007) show that these countercyclical movements in informality are the average  
for a broad cross section of developing countries.  However,  Fiess, Fugazza and  Maloney  (2007) also 
show that in numerous Latin American countries, including Mexico,  informality behaves procyclically   13
 
  It is also important to call attention to the decreasing trend in formal 
employment in Brazil across the 1990s, falling from around 62% at the beginning of the 
90s to 52% by the end of the decade.  Bosch et al. (2007) identify the principal drivers  
this secular movement to be the changes in the labor code implicit in the Constitutional 
Change of 1988, and, to a much lesser extent, trade liberalization.  Since the present 
paper is concerned with the cyclical properties of the labor market, we abstract from this 
evolution.    
 
  These cyclical properties are studied more systematically in Table 1. We show 
the standard deviations of the individual employment states as a percent of the working 
age population, the contemporaneous correlation and the implied elasticity with respect 
to output of the cyclical components of the series. We also show the cyclical behavior of 
the two series in Figure 1, the unemployment rate, and the share of formal employment. 
 
  The first panels show the behavior of inactivity, unemployment and total 
employment. The patterns found here correspond broadly to those found in the 
developed country literature: Inactivity is weakly countercyclical; unemployment is 
strongly countercyclical; and employment is strongly pro-cyclical.   
 
  However, the next panel suggests that employment dynamics hide significant 
changes in employment composition. In both countries, the pro-cyclical behavior of 
total employment is, overall, driven by the strong pro-cyclicality of formal employment. 
A 1% increase in output (from its trend) increases formal employment by 0.56% in 
Mexico and 0.50% in Brazil. Symmetrically, informal employment tends to increase in 
recessions, especially informal self-employment (0.23% and 0.17% respectively) 
 
  Finally, the last panel suggests two notable aspects of the dynamics of the 
unemployment rate (unemployment as a percentage of the labor force), and the share of 
formal employment.  First, the volatility of U/(U+E) is almost identical to the volatility 
of U suggesting that  the change in the unemployment rate is essentially driven by 
                                                                                                                                               
across some periods.  Fundamentally, a recovery driven by a positive shock to the non-tradables sector 
which is especially intensive in informal workers, will lead to a rise in the relative sector shares and 
earnings of the informal sector.     14
changes in the number of unemployed rather than fluctuations of the size of the labor 
force. Second, the share of formal employment is slightly less volatile than formal 
employment due to the positive cyclical correlation between formal employment and 
total employment. 
  
  In sum, the behavior of employment shares and the unemployment rate over the 
business cycle suggests a very traditional interpretation of the role of the informal sector 
as a shock absorber for the formal sector in times of crises and perhaps disguised 
unemployment. However, important new insights emerge as we look at the dynamics 
driving these unemployment changes, and the reallocation of workers between formal 
and informal sectors. 
 
 
IV. Cyclical Patterns of Transition Rates and Gross Flows of Workers 
 
  To understand the dynamic drivers of these movements, we examine four sets of 
worker transitions: flows into employment states, flows out employment states, flows 
between employment states, and flows between non-employment states. 
 
Flows into Employment 
Flows from non-employment into employment are remarkably similar between 
countries and, to certain extent, to patterns found in the US.  Figure 2a and 2b and table 
2 suggest that these accessions to employment are central to understanding the cyclical 
evolution of unemployment and formality.  The job finding rate in the formal sector is 
strongly pro-cyclical both from inactivity and unemployment. Its contemporaneous 
correlation with respect to output ranges between 0.5 and 0.8, and  our estimates suggest 
that a 1% fall in output (from its trend) decreases the job finding rate of formal jobs 
from unemployment in 3.5% in Mexico and 4.3% in Brazil. This mimics the evidence 
for the job finding rate in the US. 
 
Critical to our understanding of labor market adjustments is the fact that 
accessions to informal jobs are far less volatile.  The standard deviation of the transition   15
rate from unemployment into informality is around half of that of the formal sector.
18  
Furthermore, while accessions into informal salaried are also procyclical, albeit with 
weaker correlation with respect to output, inflows into self-employment are 
countercyclical, from both unemployment and inactivity, suggesting that in recessions 
some workers may chose this form of employment as employment of last resort in the 
face of lack of opportunities as a salaried workers. However, in later sections we show 
that this shift towards informal self-employment is quantitatively small in changing 
unemployment levels.  
 
 Taken together, the rate at which workers leave unemployment decreases in 
recessions. Hiring in the informal sector does not expand to fully compensate for the 
reduced access to formal sector jobs and in fact, informal salaried hires fall.  Therefore, 
there is a change in the relative composition in the outflow from unemployment arising 
from the differential movements in hiring across the cycle.  In expansions, for each 
formal hire (from unemployment), there are on average between 1.3 and 1.7 informal 
hires, compared to 3 in recessions.
19  
 
Flows out of Employment 
  Figures 3a and 3b and table 3 show the complementary flows among the three 
sectors of employment and the non-employment states, inactivity and unemployment.   
Recessions are characterized by rapid changes in the rate at which workers transit into 
unemployment, but far more from the informal sectors than the formal.  A 1% fall in 
output (from its trend) increases the separation rate of informal salaried workers by 
4.1% and 5.7% in Mexico and Brazil respectively. Separation from informal self 
employment, which implies the destruction of an informal firm, increases by 3.2% and  
3.5%, respectively. By contrast, separations from the formal sector increase by a more 
                                                 
18 Except for accessions towards informal self employment in Mexico where volatility is around 80% of 
volatility of formal accessions  
19 It is possible that these differing job finding behaviors are statistical artifacts arising from the changing 
composition of unemployment”. For example, if in recessions the pool of unemployed workers shifts 
toward young uneducated workers, who generally have a high propensity to search in the informal sector; 
this could offset the “real” decrease in the job finding rate in the informal sector. Baker (1992) refers to 
this as the “heterogeneity hypothesis. We explore this hypothesis following Shimer (2007) and studying 
changes in the composition of unemployment along three dimensions- age, education and reason of 
unemployment. We do not find any support for this view.   16
muted 1.4% and 0.6%, respectively. In  a period comprising major crises, such as the 
Mexican “tequila” crisis of 1995, or the recessions of 1983 and 1992 in Brazil, formal 
transition rates towards unemployment are only weakly countercyclical, and do not 
show  a strong correlation with output, -0.41 and -0.16 for Mexico and Brazil 
respectively.
20  These findings suggest that, consistent with the US evidence, job 
separations from “formal” jobs are not the principle drivers of unemployment, but that 
separations from the informal sectors may well be.  Although exploring the factors 
driving the different behavior of the two sectors is beyond the scope of this paper, what 
is clear is that the view of the informal economy as a competitive flex-wage sector that 
readily adjusts to absorb unemployed workers, especially those shed by the formal 
sector, is importantly incomplete.  
 
  Flows into inactivity, on the other hand, show only minor fluctuations with the 
business cycle and are either acyclical, or weakly procyclical (with the exception of the 
self-employed in Brazil), a pattern also found for the US by Hall (2005) and Shimer 
(2007).  
 
Flows among Employment Types: Formality-Informality 
 
  In the US, job to job flows dwarf in magnitude the flows in and out of 
employment (see Nagypal, 2004 and Shimer, 2005).  Our data however only permits us 
to look at flows among defined sectors. This, on the one hand will under-estimate total 
job to job flows, since we miss transitions within formality or informality, and on the 
other may over estimate them if formal-informal transitions occur within jobs.  In all, 
sector to sector flows account for around 60 to 70% of all transitions in Mexico and 
Brazil, and are therefore key to understanding the compositional pattern of employment 
and worker mobility. Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c, and Table 4 characterize these inter-
sectoral transitions, including the cross-correlation between pairs of bi-lateral flows.  
                                                 
20 One exception to this general pattern is the 2001 recession in Mexico which was characterized by an 
increase in job separation in the formal sector but not in the self employed sector and relatively modestly 
in the informal salaried sector.  The most plausible explanation is that this recession was not systemic as 
the 1995 crisis was, but mainly caused by the slowdown of the U.S. economy that affected primarily the 
largely formal manufacturing export sector in the north of the country (see Kaplan and Martinez, 2004, 
and Fiess, Fugazza and Maloney, 2007)). This emphasizes the importance of sectoral shocks to 
understanding overall labor dynamics.   17
 
  Search models predict that flows among jobs are procyclical and the cross 
correlations high, and in the US, this is the case.  However, traditional queuing models 
where the informal sector is largely disguised unemployment would suggest that 
movements from informality into formality should be strongly procyclical, while the 
reverse flow should be the opposite, much like separations towards unemployment.  In 
both Brazil and Mexico access to formality from the informal sectors is strongly pro-
cyclical as we found it to be from unemployment and inactivity (correlations range from 
0.3 to 0.74). However, flows from formality into informal self-employment in both 
countries are also pro-cyclical, of equivalent magnitude to the reverse flows in Brazil, 
although somewhat less so in Mexico.   The lower panels of figure 4a, confirm the 
logical correlate- that the pairs of bilateral flows are highly positively correlated. The 
HP de-trended series of S-F and F-S transition rates show strong positive correlations 
(0.68 and 0.76 for Mexico and Brazil respectively). 
 
  The flows from formal into informal salaried work are more ambiguous in the 
two cases.  In Brazil entry into informal salaried work from formality is procyclical, but 
less so than the reverse flows and in Mexico, again, the correlation is weakly negative 
implying countercyclical behavior.  Even still, the bilateral correlation between the F-I 
and I-F flow is positive at 0.17.   
 
  Overall, the patterns of sector to sector transitions are far more consistent with 
the job to job search models in the mainstream literature where, in periods of labor 
market tightness, workers search across available jobs in both sectors, or when workers 
are involuntarily separated in the normal churning process but find another before 
entering the unemployment pool, than to models where informal workers are queuing 
for superior formal jobs. The idea that workers might be searching across the formal and 
informal sectors is consistent with motivational responses of workers entering self 
employment in 1992 that roughly 70% of the sector had entered for either reasons of 
greater flexibility or income (Maloney 1999). The more ambiguous results for informal 
salaried work are consistent with findings of substantially less voluntary entry (Perry et. 
al. 2007).   18
  
   That said, the informal sector is clearly very heterogeneous and other data from 
the Mexican  ENEU that is suggestive that there is a component of informality that does 
correspond to disguised unemployment. Figure 4d plots the proportion of workers who 
respond positively to the question “Have you been looking for a job over the last two 
months” and who had not changed employment status from the quarter before as a 
possible proxy for the degree of dissatisfaction with the current job coupled with the 
availably of alternative jobs.  Search intensity is generally higher in the informal sector, 
perhaps, reflecting the relative youth of the informal salaried sector, although the 
magnitudes (and hence differences) are not large: in the upturns of mid-1990 and to 
2000 search rates were equal across sectors at roughly 1-2%.  However, the share 
searching is strongly countercyclical implying that as the labor market becomes slack 
and the acess ot the formal sector from all sectors decreases, the dissatisfaction 
increases.   This is especially true in the informal sectors where the percentage 
searching for better jobs peaks at just under 7% during the 1995 crisis, a gap of slightly 
over 4% points over the formal sector, suggesting that, in fact, the sector contained 
more workers who were forced into bad matches.   This would make sense if, during the 
crisis, only the informal sector was hiring: though the job finding rate in the sector is 
reasonably acyclical, the fact that unemployment is increasing does imply that it 
informality is absorbing more unemployed as a share of the workforce than during 
booms.  Consistent with the transition patterns, however, the percentage dissatisfied is a 
relative minority of the sample.      
 
Flows among Non-Employment Types: Unemployment and Inactivity 
 
Finally, figure 5 and table 5 depicts how inactivity and unemployment interact 
over the business cycle. Perhaps the most remarkable fact is the strong negative 
correlation between output and the inflow rate into unemployment from inactivity (-
0.52 in Mexico and -0.72 in Brazil). This suggests that in recessions, inactive workers 
enter the market, increasing the number of unemployed. This is reinforced by the fact 
that fewer unemployed leave the labor force. Together, these imply a further increase in 
the number of unemployed in recessions that, as we see in the next section, is of 
quantitative importance.    19
 
V. Quantifying the Impact of Changes in Gross Flows of Workers.  
  Much of the current discussion in the US literature focuses on identifying the 
relative importance of each of these flows to the evolution of cyclical unemployment.   
The issue is important to realistic modeling of labor markets, both in industrialized and, 
as this section argues, for developing countries.  In our case, where we cannot take 
formal employment as the exclusive complement to unemployment, the task becomes 
more complex. We are now concerned not only with the evolution of unemployment, 
but also the evolution of formal relative to informal employment.   
  
  In one of the earliest accounting exercises for the UK, Pissarides (1986) argued 
that the steady state unemployment rate can be simulated as a function of the job finding 


















t u  is the steady state unemployment rate and, 
s
t q and 
f
t q  are the separation 
rate and the job finding rate respectively. For the UK, the calculated unemployment rate 
tracks the actual unemployment rate remarkably closely. To identify the relative 
contribution of the two rates, Pissarides derived two counterfactual unemployment rates 
for the UK, one holding 
s
t q  at its period average level and letting 
f
t q vary, and the 
second holding the job finding rate 
f
t q  constant and letting the inflow into 
unemployment 
s
t q  fluctuate. Graphically the series holding constant the separation rate 
was remarkably similar to the actual unemployment rate whereas the correlation 
between the unemployment rate and the constant job finding rate counterfactual was 
virtually zero. This led Pissarides to argue that job finding rate was the main driver of 
the unemployment rate in the UK. A similar result was obtained by Shimer (2007) using 
the same method for the US. 
 
  Recently, a number of papers have criticized this method of “unemployment 
accounting”.   Fujita and Ramey (2006 and 2007) argue that reliable conclusions are   20
difficult with such visual inspections, and that the attribution of the change of 
unemployment to one flow or the other was difficult since the decomposition is not an 
exact one.
21 As an alternative, Fujita and Ramey (2006) offer an analytical 
decomposition of equation (4).
22 Since the decomposition is exact, the total variance of 
the cyclical unemployment rate can be easily attributable either to the variability of the 
separation rate or the job finding rate. Although technically appealing this analytical 
decomposition is difficult to operationalize when we are interested in more than just two 
employment states. Incorporating informal salaried and self employed sectors in 
addition to inactivity in our framework expands the number of states to five and makes 
an analogous exercise less straightforward to implement.
23 The variance of the 
unemployment rate can no longer be attributed neatly to particular components of the 
respective flows, since the steady state unemployment rate depends multiplicatively on 
all nxn-n flows, where n is the number of employment states.  
  
  Hence, we proceed in the spirit of  Pissarides (1986) and Shimer (2007) while 
acknowledging the method’s limitations. (In the appendix, we also attempt to cross 
check our results following Fujita and Ramey, 2007, by imposing some strong 
assumptions for tractability and obtain qualitatively very similar results.) First we 
calculate the steady state values of our labor market by solving  
sf if uf of fs fi fu fo
fs is us os sf si us os
fi si ui oi if is ui oi
fu su iu ou uf us ui uo
of so io uo of os oi ou
Sq Iq Uq Oq q q q q F
Fq Iq Uq Oq q q q q S
Fq Sq Uq Oq q q q q I
Fq Sq Iq Oq q q q q U
Fq Sq Iq Uq q q q q O
+ + + = + + +
+ + + = + + +
+ + + = + + +
+ + + = + + +






                                        (5) 
and adjusting the resulting stocks so the corresponding shares sum to unity.  Here, the 
q
xy are the transition rates from sector x to sector y and O, U, I, S and F are the number 
of inactive, unemployed self employed, informal salaried and formal salaried workers 
respectively. 
                                                 
21 That is, the two counterfactual series do not have to add up to the steady state unemployment rate.  
22 This decomposition was first suggested by Elsby et al. (2007). 
23 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2007) introduce out of the labor force as an additional state and implement 
Fujita and Ramey technique for US and a set of European countries. They decompose the steady state 
unemployment rate in four components two of which cab be  interpret as  “loosely” corresponding to the 
transitions between employment/unemployment and inactivity.    21
 
   We focus on two main indicators of the labor market, the unemployment rate 



















= in the steady state for every period. Even with five 
employment states the quarterly unemployment rate is virtually indistinguishable from 
the simulated unemployment rate. The correlation between the HP de-trended 
unemployment rate in and the steady state unemployment rate from equations (5) is 
0.97 in Mexico and 0.99 in Brazil. The correlation for the share of formal employment 
is somehow lower, but still substantial, 0.83 and 0.85 for Mexico and Brazil 
respectively. 
 
  To quantify the relative contributions of each flow, we simulate the 
counterfactual unemployment rates and the share of formal employment when each of 
the 20 possible flows in equation (5) is allowed to individually vary. Following Shimer 
(2007), we then compute the covariance of the HP de-trended counterfactual series with 
both the HP de-trended steady state unemployment rate and share of formal 
employment. Table 6a shows this set of covariances as a proportion of the variance of 
the HP de-trended steady state unemployment rate and share of formal employment.  
They can be interpreted as the contribution of the variability of a particular flow to the 
total cyclical variability of the unemployment rate (or the share of formal employment). 
A few notes of caution are in order.  First, as noted above, the decomposition is not an 
exact one and hence the sum of the contributions does not necessarily add up to one. It 
is however, a very good approximation for the unemployment rate in Mexico and Brazil 
(0.94 and 1.06) and for the share of formal employment in Mexico (1.05). However, it 
performs less well for the share of formal employment in Brazil (1.50), perhaps because 
of the sensitivity of the technique to the changing trend in the share of formal 
employment in Brazil during the 90´s.  
   22
  The messages that emerge are remarkably similar in both countries. First, the 
fluctuation of separations from employment (both from formal and informal 
employment) into unemployment is the single main contributor to changes in the 
unemployment rate. They account for 40% and 37% of variance in the unemployment 
rate in Mexico and Brazil respectively, significantly more than the 21% and 27% 
attributable to changes in the outflow rate towards employment. While this result seems 
the converse of the evidence in the US, where the job finding rate dominates US 
unemployment dynamics,
24  closer scrutiny shows that the division between formal and 
informal employment is crucial.  Most of the variation (75% in Mexico and 86% in 
Brazil) in total separations is driven by movements in the separation rates of informal 
workers (both informal salaried and self-employed), while the opposite is true of the job 
finding rate where it is the outflow from unemployment (and inactivity) towards formal 
employment that contributes far more (16% in Mexico and 17% in Brazil) to changes in 
unemployment rate than changes in the job finding rate of informal jobs (5% in Mexico  
and 10% in Brazil). This result is consistent with the distinctive patterns of job finding 
and job separation rates of the two sectors noted in the previous section. It also suggests 
that were Mexico and Brazil to be like the US in having a dominant formal salaried 
sector, our results might not be so different from those found there.   
 
Finally, reallocation across sectors and exit from the labor force does not seem 
to contribute substantially to the changes in the unemployment rate. However, the 
remaining variance (another 26% in Mexico and 36% in Brazil) can be fully attributed 
to the relationship between unemployment and inactivity, a result also consistent with 
the US evidence (See Shimer, 2007, and Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2007). 
 
Despite the dominance of job separations in determining unemployment, 
fluctuations in the share of formal employment are almost entirely driven by strong 
                                                 
24 This topic is still a matter of deep controversy. While Pissarides (2007) argues that the consensus in the 
literature is that around 1/3 of unemployment volatility is attributable to changes in the job separation rate 
and 2/3 to the job finding rate, Shimer argues that at most the contribution of the job separation rate is ¼  
and it is declining over time. However, Fujitja and Ramey (2007) argue that the fluctuation of the 
separation rate may account up to 50% of total unemployment rate variability. These estimates only 
consider two states (unemployment and employment). Perhaps a better benchmark for our results is the 
cases where inactivity is explicitly considered. Shimer (2007) points at a 23% contribution of the job 
separation rate vs a 50% of the job finding rate and Petrongolo and Pissarides (2007) 33% vs 58% 
respectively for the US.   23
procyclical formal hiring and especially from the informal sectors. In Mexico, where the 
decomposition is more precise, around 63% of total cyclical variance in the proportion 
of informal jobs can be attributed to changes in the rate at which informal workers 
access formal employment. Another 27%, can be attributed to changes in the job finding 
rate of the unemployed and inactive workers. Separation from formal employment 
accounts for only 10% and is more than compensated by the much more volatile job 
separation rate of informal workers, so the net total (formal and informal) job loss 
behaviour of the economy tends to reduce the variability of the share of formal 
employment by around 10%. 
  Strikingly, the direct outflows from formal employment into informal 
employment contribute little, 12%, in Mexico or even negatively, -24%, in Brazil. In 
fact, looking only at recessionary periods (Table 6b), in both countries the contribution 
is negative, (-5% in Mexico and -26% in Brazil). This implies that the reduction in the 
share of formal employment in recessions does not occur because of increased exits 
towards informality. In fact, the negative contributions suggest that the shut down in 
formal hiring would have led to even larger contractions in the absence of a reduction in 
separations towards informal employment.   
 
VI. Conclusions  
 
This paper uses recent techniques from the mainstream literature on labor market 
dynamics to make two contributions.  First, for two developing economies, it offers the 
first decompositions of the dynamic determinants of cyclical unemployment and formal 
employment that are methodologically comparable to those in the advanced countries.  
Second, it explores the implications of observed dynamic patterns for the debate over 
the nature of the informal sector and its role in cyclical adjustments.  We find that in 
many ways and, despite their large informal sectors, Mexico and Brazil appear to be of 
the same phylum as their advanced country counter parts with many similar labor 
market dynamics. However, there are also important differences and, we provide 
quantitative guidelines for the calibration of models of developing country labor 
markets, or those with large informal sectors.  To summarize: 
   24
First, unemployment is strongly countercyclical.  Separations appear to play a 
substantially larger role in unemployment movements than in the US. However, this is 
largely the contribution of the informal sector, not the modern formal sector which 
shows more muted fluctuations, similar to its advanced country analogue.   
 
  Second, we identify, on average, a generally procyclical evolution of the relative 
formal/informal labor shares.  This occurs despite increased separation rates from 
informality into unemployment during downturns, and a-cyclical flows in the reverse 
direction. This paradoxical combination is explained by the large countercyclical 
fluctuations in the probability of finding a formal job from all other employment states. 
Hence, consistent with the US literature explaining unemployment, the relative 
expansion of the informal sector is not primarily due to increased shedding of labor 
from the formal sector during downturns. 
 
Third, analogous to the US literature, flows among employment states are 
largely procyclical and intense, including those among the formal and informal sectors.  
This is not consistent with the view of the informal sector as predominantly the 
disadvantaged end of a segmented labor market and more consistent with standard job 
matching models.  The finding that informality appears more as a job alternative than 
disguised unemployment for most workers implies that we need to focus less on 
segmenting distortions, and more on the cost-benefit analysis that agents undertake in 
choosing among sectors.  In particular, as stressed by Levy (2007), we need to be more 
attentive to the impact of subsidies to becoming informal broadly construed, with 
attendant implications for aggregate productivity and worker welfare, on the decisions 
of the marginal worker.   
 
Together, these findings give a view of labor market adjustment in LDCs across 
the business cycle that has elements of the traditional view of informality expanding 
across downturns, but perhaps with an updated mechanism focusing on relative hiring 
rates, and without a connotation of overall inferiority of the informal sector.   
 
From the point of view of modelling and calibrating a labor market with 
informal jobs, two findings merit emphasis.   First, explaining unemployment volatility 
necessarily implies taking into consideration the highly volatile job separation rates of   25
the informal workers. Models arguing that the informal sector is a flexible competitive, 
frictionless market will be unable to generate the large fluctuations of the 
unemployment rate observed in less developed countries. And second, volatility of the 
share of formal employment is almost entirely determined by access to formal 
employment, especially from informal jobs. Much like access towards employment can 
explain most of the variability in the unemployment rate in the US. Neither job 
separations towards unemployment nor to other informal jobs are able to explain much 
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Notes: The share of formal employment, F/E, is constructed as the number of formal workers over total 
employment. Unemployment rate, U/(U+E), corresponds to the number of unemployed workers over the 
total labour force. The series have been smoothed using a 4 quarter moving average to remove high 
frequency fluctuations. The bottom panels shows the series logged and de-trended using an HP filter with 
lambda 1600. Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn from the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey 
(ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil (right panels) is drawn from the Monthly 
Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q2. Shaded areas indicate 
recessions.   31
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Notes: The graph shows the transition rates from inactivity (O=Out of the Labor Force) into the three 
employment sectors (S=Informal Self-employed, I=Informal Salaried, , F=Formal Sector). Transition 
rates are inferred from the continuous time transition matrix for each period obtained following the 
procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in Section III. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte 
Carlo replications. The series have been smoothed using a 4 quarter moving average to remove high 
frequency fluctuations. The bottom panels shows the series logged de-trended using an HP filter with 
lambda 1600. Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn from the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey 
(ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil (right panels) is drawn from the Monthly 
Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q2. Shaded areas indicate 
recessions.   32
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U-F (HP)
 
Notes: The graph shows the transition rates from unemployment (U=Unemployment) into the three 
employment sectors (S=Informal Self-employed, I=Informal Salaried, , F=Formal Sector). Transition 
rates are inferred from the continuous time transition matrix for each period obtained following the 
procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in Section III. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte 
Carlo replications. The series have been smoothed using a 4 quarter moving average to remove high 
frequency fluctuations. The bottom panels shows the series logged and de-trended using an HP filter with 
lambda 1600. Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn from the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey 
(ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil (right panels) is drawn from the Monthly 
Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q2. Shaded areas indicate 
recessions. 
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S-O (HP) I-O (HP)
F-O (HP)
 
Notes: The graph shows the transition rates from the three employment sectors (S=Informal Self-
employed, I=Informal Salaried, , F=Formal Sector) into Inactivity (O=Out of the Labor Force). Transition 
rates are inferred from the continuous time transition matrix for each period obtained following the 
procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in Section III. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte 
Carlo replications. The series have been smoothed using a 4 quarter moving average to remove high 
frequency fluctuations. The bottom panels shows the series logged and de-trended using an HP filter with 
lambda 1600. Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn from the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey 
(ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil (right panels) is drawn from the Monthly 
Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q2. Shaded areas indicate 
recessions. 
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Notes: The graph shows the transition rates from the three employment sectors (S=Informal Self-
employed, I=Informal Salaried, , F=Formal Sector) into unemployment (U=Unemployment). Transition 
rates are inferred from the continuous time transition matrix for each period obtained following the 
procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in Section III. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte 
Carlo replications. The series have been smoothed using a 4 quarter moving average to remove high 
frequency fluctuations. The bottom panels shows the series logged and de-trended using an HP filter with 
lambda 1600. Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn from the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey 
(ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil (right panels) is drawn from the Monthly 
Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q2. Shaded areas indicate 
recessions. 
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Figure 4a: Cross Sectoral Flows (F-S) (Trends and Cycle): Mexico an Brazil 
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Notes: The graph shows the transition rates between informal self-employed (S=Informal Self-Employed) 
and the formal sector (F=Formal Sector). Transition rates are inferred from the continuous time transition 
matrix for each period obtained following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in Section III. 
Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. The series have been smoothed using a 4 
quarter moving average to remove high frequency fluctuations. The bottom panels shows the  series 
logged and de-trended series using an HP filter with lambda 1600. Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn 
from the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil 
(right panels) is drawn from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 
to 2001:Q2. Shaded areas indicate recessions. 
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I-F (HP) F-I (HP)
 
Notes: The graph shows the transition rates between informal self-employed (S=Informal Self-Employed) 
and the informal salaried (I=Informal Salaried). Transition rates are inferred from the continuous time 
transition matrix for each period obtained following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in 
Section III. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. The series have been smoothed 
using a 4 quarter moving average to remove high frequency fluctuations. The bottom panels shows the 
series logged and de-trended using an HP filter with lambda 1600. Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn 
from the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil 
(right panels) is drawn from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 
to 2001:Q2. Shaded areas indicate recessions. 
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S-I (HP) I-S (HP)
 
Notes: The graph shows the transition rates between informal salaried (I=Informal Salaried) and the 
formal sector (F=Formal Sector). Transition rates are inferred from the continuous time transition matrix 
for each period obtained following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in Section III. 
Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. The series have been smoothed using a 4 
quarter moving average to remove high frequency fluctuations. The bottom panels shows the series 
logged and  de-trended using an HP filter with lambda 1600. Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn from 
the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil (right 
panels) is drawn from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 
2001:Q2. Shaded areas indicate recessions. 
   38


















Note: Quarterly data from the National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Searching 
(j) refers to the proportion of employed workers in sector j who claim to be looking for a new job and 
have not changed employment status in the previous quarter.     39




































































1987q1 1991q3 1996q1 2000q3 2005q1













1983q1 1988q1 1993q1 1998q1 2003q1
 
O-U (HP) U-O (HP)
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the transition rates between inactivity (O=Out of the Labor Force) and 
unemployment (U=Unemployed). Transition rates are inferred from the continuous time transition matrix 
for each period obtained following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in Section III. 
Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. The series have been smoothed using a 4 
quarter moving average to remove high frequency fluctuations. The bottom panels shows the series 
logged and de-trended using an HP filter with lambda 1600. Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn from 
the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil (right 
panels) is drawn from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 
2001:Q2. Shaded areas indicate recessions. 
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Table 1: Cyclical Properties of Employment States Mexico and Brazil 
 
Mexico Brazil
Series St. Dev Correlation  Elasticity St. Dev Correlation  Elasticity
O 0.010 -0.157 -0.059 0.012 -0.123 -0.070
U 0.130 -0.878 -4.235 0.109 -0.816 -4.421
E 0.008 0.753 0.234 0.011 0.535 0.288
S 0.015 -0.415 -0.235 0.016 -0.219 -0.172
I 0.019 -0.243 -0.170 0.026 0.030 0.038
F 0.019 0.780 0.560 0.016 0.616 0.498
U/U+E 0.129 -0.889 -4.263 0.110 -0.817 -4.475
F/E 0.013 0.674 0.325 0.010 0.431 0.210  
Notes: The table shows the standard deviation, the correlation with output and the elasticity with respect 
to output of the logged and HP filter de-trended of different employment statuses for Mexico and Brazil.  
The series have been smoothed using a 4 quarter moving average to remove high frequency fluctuations. 
O=Out of the Labour Force, U=Unemployment, E=Employment, S=Informal Self-Employed, I=Informal 
Salaried, and F=Formal Sector, all as proportions of working age population. Data for Mexico (left 
panels) is drawn from the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. 
Data for Brazil (right panels) is drawn from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged 
from 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q2. 
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Table 2: Cyclical Properties of Transition Rates out of Employment: Mexico and Brazil 
 
Mexico Brazil
Series St. Dev Correlation  Elasticity St. Dev Correlation  Elasticity
O-S 0.045 -0.076 -0.127 0.040 -0.135 -0.280
O-I 0.032 0.353 0.420 0.043 0.442 0.972
O-F 0.085 0.573 1.812 0.073 0.527 1.983
U-S 0.094 -0.433 -1.511 0.059 -0.600 -1.752
U-I 0.055 0.366 0.748 0.052 0.617 1.628
U-F 0.120 0.798 3.554 0.128 0.652 4.285
  
Notes: The table shows the standard deviation, the correlation with output and the elasticity with respect 
to output of the logged and HP filter de-trended transition rates from non employment (O and U) into 
employment (S,I and F) for Mexico and Brazil.  Transition rates are inferred from the continuous time 
transition matrix for each period obtained following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in 
Section III. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. The series have been smoothed 
using a 4 quarter moving average to remove high frequency fluctuations.  O=Out of the Labour Force, 
U=Unemployment, E=Employment, S=Informal Self-Employed, I=Informal Salaried, and F=Formal 
Sector, all as proportions of working age population. Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn from the 
quarterly National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil (right panels) 
is drawn from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q2.   42




Series St. Dev Correlation  Elasticity St. Dev Correlation  Elasticity
S-O 0.032 0.108 0.128 0.037 -0.298 -0.563
I-O 0.035 0.402 0.519 0.039 0.135 0.271
F-O 0.081 0.240 0.720 0.051 0.125 0.325
S-U 0.167 -0.716 -3.156 0.154 -0.725 -3.485
I-U 0.118 -0.665 -4.141 0.093 -0.730 -5.742
F-U 0.093 -0.416 -1.440 0.072 -0.162 -0.600
 
Notes: The table shows the standard deviation, the correlation with output and the elasticity with respect 
to output of the logged and HP filter de-trended transition rates from employment (S,I and F) into non 
employment (O and U) for Mexico and Brazil.  Transition rates are inferred from the continuous time 
transition matrix for each period obtained following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in 
Section III. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. The series have been smoothed 
using a 4 quarter moving average to remove high frequency fluctuations.  O=Out of the Labour Force, 
U=Unemployment, E=Employment, S=Informal Self-Employed, I=Informal Salaried, and F=Formal 
Sector, all as proportions of working age population. Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn from the 
quarterly National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil (right panels) 
is drawn from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q2. 
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Table 4: Cyclical Properties of Transition Rates among Employment Sectors: Mexico and Brazil  
 
Mexico Brazil
Series St. Dev Correlation  Elasticity Cross Cor St. Dev Correlation  Elasticity Cross Cor
S-I 0.030 -0.013 -0.014 0.424 0.037 0.008 0.014 0.621
I-S 0.035 0.092 0.122 0.033 -0.187 -0.314
I-F 0.038 0.574 0.798 0.174 0.039 0.740 1.467 0.486
F-I 0.026 -0.273 -0.269 0.041 0.319 0.658
S-F 0.074 0.425 1.171 0.670 0.061 0.303 0.946 0.761
F-S 0.069 0.179 0.416 0.053 0.353 0.951  
Notes: The table shows the standard deviation, the correlation with output and the elasticity with respect to oput of the logged and HP filter de-trended transition rates 
across employmetn states (S,I and F) for Mexico and Brazil. We also report the cross correlation among bi-lateral flows. Transition rates are inferred from the 
continuous time transition matrix for each period obtained following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) outlined in Section III. Computations are based on 
10.000 Monte Carlo replications. The series have been smoothed using a 4 quarter moving average to remove high frequency fluctuations.  O=Out of the Labour 
Force, U=Unemployment, E=Employment, S=Informal Self-Employed, I=Informal Salaried, and F=Formal Sector, all as proportions of working age population. 
Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn from the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil (right panels) is drawn 
from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q2.    44
Table 5: Cyclical Properties of Transition Rates among Non- Employment Sectors: Mexico and 
Brazil   
Mexico Brazil
Series St.  Dev Correlation Elasticity St.  Dev Correlation Elasticity
O-U 0.115 -0.517 -2.207 0.109 -0.715 -3.937
U-O 0.074 0.536 1.407 0.043 0.381 0.813  
Notes: The table shows the standard deviation, the correlation with output and the elasticity with 
respect to output of the logged and HP filter de-trended transition rates across non-employmetn 
states (O and U) for Mexico and Brazil. Transition rates are inferred from the continuous time 
transition matrix for each period obtained following the procedure by Geweke et al. (1986) 
outlined in Section III. Computations are based on 10.000 Monte Carlo replications. The series 
have been smoothed using a 4 quarter moving average to remove high frequency fluctuations.  
O=Out of the Labour Force, U=Unemployment, E=Employment, S=Informal Self-Employed, 
I=Informal Salaried, and F=Formal Sector, all as proportions of working age population. Data 
for Mexico (left panels) is drawn from the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) from 
1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil (right panels) is drawn from the Monthly Employment 
Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q2.    45
Table 6a: Contribution to the Unemployment Rate and Share of Formal Employment Volatility.  
  Unemployment Rate  Share of Formal Employment 
  Mexico   Brazil  Mexico   Brazil 
Job Separations Rates  0.40  0.37  -0.10  -0.03 
      
I-U 0.22  0.18  -0.11  -0.08 
S-U 0.08  0.14  -0.09  -0.14 
F-U  0.10 0.05 0.10 0.19 
      
Job  Finding  Rates  0.21 0.27 0.27 0.54 
      
O-F  0.03 0.04 0.10 0.28 
U-F  0.13 0.13 0.17 0.25 
      
O-I 0.02  0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
U-I 0.04  0.11  -0.04  -0.04 
      
O-S  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 
U-S -0.01  -0.03  0.03  0.03 
      
Job Reallocation Rates  0.05  0.06  0.81  1.12 
      
I-F  0.03 0.06 0.50 0.87 
S-F  0.00 0.01 0.13 0.36 
      
F-I  0.00 -0.02 0.08 -0.07 
F-S  0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.17 
      
I-S  0.00 0.02 0.05 0.10 
S-I  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
      
Exit of the labor force  0.02  0.00  0.03  -0.04 
      
I-O  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
S-O  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
F-O  0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.03 
      
Unemployment-Inactivity 0.26  0.36  -0.06  -0.09 
U-O 0.03  0.08  -0.01  -0.03 
O-U 0.23  0.28  -0.05  -0.06 
      
Total  Contributions  0.94 1.06 0.95 1.50 
Notes: The table presents the contribution of   the cyclical component of each flow to cyclical volatility of 
the unemployment rate and the share of formal employment for Mexico and Brazil following Shimer ( 
2007). We compute the covariance between the HP de-trended steady state unemployment rate (and share 
of formal employment) with the counterfactual of the series derived from setting all the possible flows at 
their average level and allowing only the flow of interest to vary. We present the covariance as a 
proportion of the variance of the series. O=Out of the Labour Force, U=Unemployment, E=Employment, 
S=Informal Self-Employed, I=Informal Salaried, and F=Formal Sector. Data for Mexico is drawn from 
the quarterly National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil is drawn 
from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q2.  
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Table 6b: Contribution to the Unemployment Rate and Share of Formal Employment Volatility: 
Recessions 
 
   Unemployment Rate  Share of Formal Employment 
   Mexico   Brazil  Mexico   Brazil 
Job Separations Rates  0.41  0.37  -0.19  -0.06 
        
I-U 0.24  0.19  -0.16  -0.09 
S-U 0.09  0.15  -0.15  -0.14 
F-U 0.09  0.03  0.12  0.17 
        
Job Finding Rates  0.20  0.21  0.34  0.69 
        
O-F 0.02  0.05  0.11  0.36 
U-F 0.12  0.13  0.26  0.26 
        
O-I 0.01  -0.01  -0.02  0.01 
U-I 0.06  0.07  -0.05  -0.03 
        
O-S 0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.06 
U-S -0.02  -0.02  0.04  0.03 
        
Job Reallocation Rates  0.05  0.07  0.94  0.89 
        
I-F 0.03  0.06  0.74  0.80 
S-F 0.01  0.01  0.18  0.35 
        
F-I -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02 
F-S 0.01  -0.01  -0.04  -0.25 
        
I-S 0.00  0.02  0.09  0.05 
S-I 0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.04 
        
Exit of the labor force  -0.03  -0.08  0.00  -0.16 
        
I-O -0.01  0.00  0.03  -0.01 
S-O -0.01  0.02  0.04  -0.06 
F-O -0.02  -0.10  -0.07  -0.09 
        
Unemployment-Inactivity 0.23  0.41  -0.08  -0.10 
U-O -0.01  0.07  -0.01  -0.03 
O-U 0.24  0.34  -0.07  -0.07 
        
Total Contributions  0.86  0.98  1.00  1.26 
Notes: The table presents the contribution of   the cyclical component of each flow to cyclical volatility of 
the unemployment rate an the share of formal employment for Mexico and Brazil in recessions following 
Shimer, 2007. We define recession as output below trend. We compute the covariance between the HP 
de-trended steady state unemployment rate (and share of formal employment) with the counterfactual of 
the HP de-trended series derived from setting all the possible flows at their average level and allowing 
only the flow of interest to vary. We present the covariance as a proportion of the variance of the series. 
O=Out of the Labour Force, U=Unemployment, E=Employment, S=Informal Self-Employed, I=Informal 
Salaried, and F=Formal Sector. Data for Mexico is drawn from the quarterly National Urban Labor 
Survey (ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil is drawn from the Monthly Employment 
Survey (PME), quarterly averaged from 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q2.  
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Table A.1: Contribution to the Unemployment Rate and Share of Formal Employment Volatility using Fijuta and Ramey Decomposition. 
 
 Unemployment  Rate  Formal  Employment 
 Inflows  Outflows-F  Outflows-I  Outflows-S  Error  Inflows Outflows-I  Outflows-S Outflows-U  Error 
Whole Sample              
Mexico   0.82 0.20 0.02 -0.03  -0.01 0.69 0.08 0.01 0.19 0.04 
Brazil 0.69  0.22  0.11  -0.03  0.01 1.22 -0.21  -0.16 0.18 -0.02 
            
Recession             
Mexico   0.76  0.24  0.04  -0.01  -0.02 0.84 -0.05 -0.01 0.17 0.05 
Brazil 0.65  0.26  0.09  0.00  0.00  1.31 -0.15 -0.22 0.08 -0.02 
Notes: The table presents the contribution of   the cyclical component of each flow to cyclical volatility of the unemployment rate an the share of formal employment for 
Mexico and Brazil following Fujita and Ramey, 2007. We define recession as output below trend. O=Out of the Labour Force, U=Unemployment, E=Employment, 
S=Informal Self-Employed, I=Informal Salaried, and F=Formal Sector, all as proportions of working age population. Data for Mexico (left panels) is drawn from the quarterly 
National Urban Labor Survey (ENEU) from 1987:Q1 to 2004:Q4. Data for Brazil (right panels) is drawn from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME), quarterly averaged 





We briefly show the alternative procedure for unemployment accounting designed by 
Fujita and Ramey (2007). Considering only employment and unemployment, they show 















Where  t u  is the current unemployment rate, 
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t u  is the steady state unemployment rate 
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linearizing around the trend values of 
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Where, 
* u , 
s q  and 
f q  are the trend components of the steady state unemployment 
rate, the separation rate and the job finding respectively. In (A.2) the cyclical 
component of the steady state unemployment depends separately on the deviations of 
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The total contribution of the inflow and outflow rates can be expressed as proportion of 
total variation in 
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t u  where the weights or “beta values” mapping each of the three 
components in the right hand side of equation (5) to changes in 
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And where  1 = + +
e f s β β β .  
Incorporating the informal sector 
  Incorporating informal salaried and self employed sectors expands the number 
of states to five and makes an analogous exercise somewhat less straightforward to 
implement. The variance of the unemployment rate can no longer be attributed neatly to 
particular components of the respective flows.   Therefore, in order to operationalize 
(A.2) for our data, we make two important assumptions. First, as most of the studies for 
the US we abstract from flows in and out of inactivity. This way we get comparable 
estimates of those of Fujita and Ramey (2007). Second, we constrain the inflow rate 
into unemployment and formal employment to be common from all sectors. As the 
discussion above suggests, inflow rates into unemployment and formality are 
reasonably homogenous from every other sector of employment (countercyclical and 
procyclical, respectively).  Outflows are not, however, and we leave those 
unconstrained.  Those from unemployment into formal employment are strongly 
procyclical while mildly countercyclical towards informal self-employment. Those from 
formal employment towards unemployment are very different from those towards other 
(informal) employment sectors.  
 
   Under these assumptions the unemployment rate and the proportion of formal 
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−  represents the average rate of entering unemployment and 
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− − − + +  represent the outflow rates form unemployment and formal 
employment. 
 
  These assumptions do not do great violence to our simulations:  the calculated 
steady state unemployment rate are, again, virtually identical to the actual series and 
their correlations are over 0.9 for both countries. This suggests that we are capturing 
most of the relevant variation.  
 
  Analogous to equation (A.4), we decompose total variation in unemployment 
and formal employment into flows into unemployment, and the outflows towards 
formality and informality. 
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Similarly, the variance in formal employment can be decompose as, 









 are calculated by estimating a two by two instantaneous transition matrix following 




we divide the observations between employment 




 is equivalent to the separation rate 
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the average inflow rate towards formal employment from unemployment an informal employment.    51
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  Table A.1 reports the decomposition in (A.7) and (A.8) for the whole sample 
and periods of recessions. The emerging message in both countries is qualitatively very 
similar to the results presented in earlier sections. Once we abstract from inactivity, 
between 70 to 80% of variance in unemployment is due to fluctuations in separation 
rates from the various sectors of employment. Another 20% is due to changes in the 
outflow rate towards formal employment.  Also consistent with the findings of the 
previous section, and the US literature, only 10-20% of changes in formal employment 
are accounted for by fluctuations in the outflow rate from the sector with the majority 
being driven by the strong procyclicality of hiring. In Mexico, 70% variation in formal 
employment is accounted for by variations in inflows while in Brazil, the number 
exceeds 100%. That is, the shut down in hiring would have led to even larger 
contractions in the absence of a strong reduction in separations.  This, of course, implies 
that the outflow rate towards informality is positively correlated with the variability of 
formal employment.  This is a pattern that is common for both countries in times of 
recessions. 